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When a key press causes a stimulus, the key press is perceived later and the stimulus ear-
lier than key presses and stimuli presented independently.This bias in time perception has
been linked to the intention to produce the effect and thus been called intentional binding
(IB). In recent studies it has been shown that the IB effect is stronger when participants
believed that they caused the effect stimulus compared to when they believed that another
person caused the effect (Desantis et al., 2011). In this experiment we ask whether causal
beliefs influence the perceived time of an effect when the putative effect occurs temporally
close to another stimulus that is also an effect. In our study two participants performed
the same task on connected computers with separate screens. Each trial started synchro-
nously on both computers. When a participant pressed a key, a red and a yellow stimulus
appeared as action effects simultaneously or with a slight delay of up to 50 ms.The partic-
ipants’ task was to judge the temporal order of these two effect stimuli. Participants were
either told that one participant caused one of the two stimuli while the other participant
seated at the other computer caused the other stimulus, or each participant was told that
he/she caused both stimuli. The different causal beliefs changed the perceived time of the
effects’ appearance relative to each other. When participants believed they each caused
one effect, their “own” effect was perceived earlier than the other participant’s effect.
When the participants believed each caused both effects, no difference in the perceived
temporal order of the red and yellow effect was found. These results confirm that higher
order causal beliefs change the perceived time of an action effect even in a setting in which
the occurrence of the putative effect can be directly compared to a reference stimulus.
Keywords: intentional binding, causal belief, causality, temporal order judgments,TOJ, agency
INTRODUCTION
When an action triggers an effect stimulus, the action and the
effect are perceived to be closer to each other in time. For example,
when the time of an operant action causing a tone is estimated in
relation to a revolving clock hand, the action is perceived later than
a non-operant action that does not cause an effect (Haggard et al.,
2002a,b; Haggard, 2005). Additionally, tone effects in the operant
condition are perceived earlier than tones presented in isolation.
Thus, in the operant condition action and effect tone are perceived
to be closer in time than actions and tones alone.
This bias in perceived time has been termed intentional binding
(IB) because the bias is restricted to conditions in which partici-
pants intentionally perform actions. Recent studies demonstrated
that key presses and subsequent stimuli are perceived to be closer to
each other in time when freely chosen actions produced the stimuli
as their effects. However, when the participant’s finger was moved
by the key (Wohlschläger et al., 2003a) or the movement of the fin-
ger was triggered by a TMS signal (Haggard et al., 2002b) instead of
the movement being initialized by the participant him/herself, key
presses were perceived earlier and/or tomes were perceived later in
these “unintentional” movement conditions, i.e., a reversed pat-
tern of results compared to intentional movement conditions was
observed.
Interestingly, IB is not restricted to own actions, but also occurs
with observed actions performed by another person (Wohlschläger
et al., 2003b). In their intentional observation condition partici-
pants judged the time when another person pressed a key. In the
unintentional condition participants watched how a key with a
rubber hand lying on the key moved downward. The action was
perceived to be later in the intentional conditions than in the unin-
tentional rubber hand condition. Thus, the perceived time of the
action as a measure of IB is restricted to intentional conditions
in which the observer attributes the key presses to an intentional
action, even if it is only observed (see also Wohlschläger et al.,
2003a). Similarly, the perceived times of actions and effects of a
co-actor are closer to each other to a similar degree as those of
own actions (Strother et al., 2010).
However, these results are in contrast to a study of Engbert
et al. (2007) where no difference in the perceived duration of
intervals was found between observed actions of the experimenter
and observed key movements with a rubber hand resting on the
key. This difference could arise from the different methods used,
namely duration estimation and the estimation of the points in
time of action and effect. It has been suggested that those meth-
ods focus differently on diverging aspects of IB (Humphreys
and Buehner, 2009). The estimation of duration relies more
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on inferential postdictive processes while methods focusing on
points in time of action and effect rely on shorter-lived predictive
processes. However, this explanation is speculative and has not
been directly tested.
To conclude, IB in terms of a shift in the perceived time of action
and/or effect occurs for intentional movements, that is for move-
ments that aim at producing a specific effect. IB is not restricted
to own intentional actions, but it also occurs for actions of other
people that the observer believes to be intentional behavior.
Given that the bias in time perception for actions and contin-
gently following effects depends on own intentional behavior or
the belief that a person behaved intentionally, one may assume
that IB is stronger for own actions compared to other persons’
actions. For another person’s actions the intention of the actor
has to be inferred, while for own actions the intention to act is an
inherent predecessor (if not the ultimate cause) of the action. If IB
is stronger for own actions compared to another person’s actions,
own action effects should be perceived earlier than action effects
that are caused or at least believed to be caused by someone else.
In line with this reasoning, Desantis et al. (2011) showed that a
tone that was caused by a participant was perceived earlier when
the participant believed he/she had caused the tone than when the
participant believed that the tone had been caused by a key press of
another person in the room, a confederate of the experimenters.
In their experiment each trial started with the presentation of
either the name of the participant or the name of a confederate
to inform the participant which one would allegedly be causing
a tone effect in this trial. Then, the participant and the confed-
erate pressed a key at approximately the same time. In reality it
was always the participant who caused the tone to appear 350,
550, or 750 ms after the key press. After each trial, the participant
indicated when he/she had perceived the tone by reporting the
position of a revolving clock hand at the moment he/she had per-
ceived the tone. As predicted, participants perceived effects earlier
when they believed they had caused the effect compared to the sit-
uation when participants believed the confederate had caused the
effect, demonstrating that causal belief influenced the perceived
time of the effect.
In the current study we aimed at finding further support for
the notion that allegedly “own” action effects are perceived ear-
lier than allegedly “another person’s” action effects by using a new
design and a psychophysical method to assess time judgments
instead of the clock method. In our study two participants per-
formed the experiment simultaneously. Participants were asked to
imagine that they were the security officer of a ship and had to
save a passenger who fell overboard. The participants’ task was
to release either one or two life buoys into the water by pressing
a key as quickly as possible. After pressing the key, a red and a
yellow life buoy appeared. The temporal order of the two stimuli
varied slightly, with a delay of up to 50 ms (varied in 10 ms steps
from −50 ms to +50 ms). Half of the participants believed they
took part in a shared task and that they caused an “own” single
effect, e.g., the red buoy appearing, while the other participant
caused the other effect, e.g., the yellow buoy appearing (single
effect group). The other half of participants believed as a control
group that they always caused one compound effect consisting of
the two effect stimuli, i.e., the red and the yellow buoy (compound
effect group). That is, in both groups each participant in reality
triggered both the red and the yellow life buoy with his/her key
press. However, only the compound effect group was veridically
instructed that each participant would cause both effects as a com-
pound effect with his/her key press in each trial. The single effect
group believed that each participant caused one specific stimulus
of the two effects.
To assess the perceived time of action effects, participants per-
formed a temporal order judgment (TOJ) task. That is, they
indicated which effect (i.e., the yellow or the red one) they per-
ceived first in each trial. With this design we could directly compare
the influence of causal belief on the temporal perception. In the
single effect group one effect (e.g., the yellow one) was believed to
be the “own” effect while the other effect was believed to be the
“other participant’s” effect. So for this group the temporal order
of the red and the yellow effect directly represents the order of the
“own” and the “other’s” effect. The compound effect group serves
as a control group to ensure that not generally the effect of one
specific color is preferred regarding temporal order.
Temporal order judgments allow us to estimate IB effects with
a psychophysical method. Choosing a psychophysical method also
offered the opportunity to analyze not only the perceived time of
the effect stimuli relative to each other, but also to compare the
temporal resolution of time judgments (Nolden et al., 2012). By
using this method we could test not only if the TOJs were biased
by the causal belief, but also if participants were less able to dis-
tinguish the perceived temporal order of events due to this bias.
Regarding the perceived time of effects, we expected that putative
“own” effects are perceived earlier than effects that were believed to
be caused by another person. When a participant believes he/she
caused both effects, the perceived time of those effects should lie
in between.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-eight students of the University of Wuerzburg (18 male,
all right-handed) participated in the experiment due to course
requirements. Participants were between 18 and 28 years old
(mean 20 years). The data of one additional participant were
replaced as he/she did not believe that the experimental com-
puters were actually connected. As the experiment could only be
conducted with two participants at a time, the replacing partici-
pant took part together with one further participant, whose data
were discarded to maintain counter balanced conditions.
APPARATUS AND STIMULI
The experiment was run on two standard PCs equipped with 17′′
CRT screens. The PCs were connected via the computers’ parallel
ports to synchronize the beginning of each trial. Stimulus presen-
tation and data collection were accomplished with the software
package E-Prime2 (Schneider et al., 2002).
The experimental setup is shown in Figure 1. The two screens
were placed side by side (distance ca. 1.5 m) with a divider wall
in between to ensure that participants only saw their own screen.
During the main part of the experiment participants sat in front of
their screen. To avoid the participant hearing the other participant
pressing the key, both participants wore Vic Firth SIH1 isolation
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental layout.The two computers were connected via
parallel port. The situation depicts an instruction block in the single effect
group: The right participant performs key presses always triggering his
“own” effect, here the red life buoy, while the left participant watches.
Earlier the right participant had watched the left participant triggering her
“own” effect, the yellow life buoy. After the instruction phase each
participant performed the task on his/her computer separated by the
divider wall. Throughout experimental trials both participants wore
headphones delivering white noise to ensure they did not hear button
presses.
headphones. The experimenter stayed in the room throughout the
entire experiment to ensure that participants did not communicate
with each other.
Stimuli were presented on an avy blue background. All messages
were printed in white. We used a white fixation cross extending
0.7 cm. The imperative stimulus was the head of a person wearing
a swim cap (diameter 1.9 cm) that appeared in the middle of the
screen, described as a passenger who fell overboard. The targets for
the temporal order task were a red and a yellow life buoy (diameter
3.9 cm) appearing 2 cm left or right of the center of the screen.
PROCEDURE
In each session two participants took part and were either both
assigned to the single effect group or both to the compound effect
group. Where not stated otherwise, the procedure was the same for
both groups. All participants were asked to imagine they were a
security officer of a ship who has to save a passenger who repeatedly
falls overboard. The participants’ task was to release one (single
effect group) or two life buoys (compound effect group) by press-
ing the left mouse button as fast as possible. After pressing the key,
the two life buoys appeared with a slight temporal delay (see trial
structure described below).
In the single effect condition, each participant was told that
he/she was in control over one of the two life buoys on both com-
puters while the other participant controlled the other life buoy
via the connecting cable. One participant was told to control the
red life buoy (single red effect condition) and the other participant
was told to control the yellow life buoy (single yellow effect condi-
tion). In the compound effect group, both participants were told to
control both buoys on their own computer. The connection of the
computers was explained to ensure that the experiment ran syn-
chronously for both participants in the compound effect group.
As each participant caused both effects on his screen, actually in
both groups only the starting time of each trial was synchronized.
To improve the credibility of the group-specific instructions
regarding who caused which life buoy to occur, participants per-
formed an instruction phase before the main experiment. First,
each participant was informed by written instructions that he/she
caused either the red buoy, the yellow buoy, or both buoys to
appear. Each of the two participants then performed an instruc-
tion block while the other participant stood behind and watched
(see Figure 1). In the single effect group only the participant’s
“own” effect appeared randomly on the left or right side of the
“drowning” passenger. In the compound effect group always both
buoys appeared with the assignment of color to side of the screen
counterbalanced within participants. After the first participant had
completed the instruction block, it was his/her turn to watch the
second participant accomplishing the instruction block.
During the rest of the experiment participants wore isolation
headphones and heard constant white noise. The volume of the
white noise was adjusted so that participants did not hear the
sounds caused by the mouse clicks. Each trial started with the fix-
ation cross presented centrally for 100 ms (for a schematic sketch
of experimental trials see Figure 2). After a blank of 500 ms the
imperative stimulus, the passenger, followed. The participants’ task
was to press the left mouse button as quickly as possible in response
to the passenger’s appearance. When the participant pressed the
button within the time limit of 750 ms the first of the two effects
(life buoys) appeared after a variable interval of between 400 and
610 ms after response onset. The second effect appeared either at
www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 393 | 3
Haering and Kiesel Mine is earlier than yours
FIGURE 2 | Schematic trial procedure of the temporal order judgment
(TOJ) task. Effect stimuli (the life buoys) were presented simultaneously
or separated by a delay of 10–50 ms. TOJs were given by clicking on the
life buoy the participant judged to have appeared earlier. The location of red
and yellow stimuli on the screen was counterbalanced within participants.
For better readability in the figure the background color is shown in white
instead of blue in the experiment and texts are printed in black instead of
white.
the same time (i.e., separated by a delay of 0 ms) or after 10, 20,
30, 40, or 50 ms. We will here after refer to these delays as tem-
poral distance of the yellow effect in relation to the red one, that
is, positive delays (10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 ms) indicate that the red
effect appeared first, and negative delays (−50, −40, −30, −20,
and−10 ms) indicate that the yellow effect appeared first.
After both effects were visible for 1000 ms, participants were
asked to indicate which buoy appeared first (the German words
“Welcher Rettungsring war zuerst?” appeared above the stimuli).
For this TOJ task, the mouse cursor appeared 4.5 cm below the
passenger and the participant had to click on the buoy he/she
believed appeared first. After clicking on a buoy, all stimuli and
the mouse cursor disappeared. The next trial started 1000 ms after
both participants had clicked on a buoy.
If a participant did not press the mouse button within 750 ms
after the imperative stimulus (the passenger) appeared, the pas-
senger disappeared, and an error message reminded the partic-
ipant to respond as quickly as possible to save the passenger
from drowning (“Bittereagierenach Erscheinen des Passagiersim
Wasser so schnellwiemöglich, sonstertrinkter!”). Participants had
to acknowledge this message by clicking on a check box labeled
“Ok!” to end the trial. This time limit was introduced to avoid
very slow responses, because participants could easily realize
that very slow responses did not, contrary to the instructions,
always cause the “own” effect to appear later than the “other’s”
effect.
We included some reminder trials without TOJs in which only
one effect occurred to remind participants who controlled which
effect. In the single effect groups the“own”effect was accompanied
by the message “Diesmal war der andereim Vergleichzulangsam.
Du hast den Passagiergerettet!” (German for “This time the other
participant was in comparison too slow. You saved the passen-
ger!”). The allegedly “other’s” effect was accompanied by the mes-
sage “Diesmalwarst Du im Vergleichzulangsam. Der andere hat
den Passagiergerettet!” (German for “This time you were slower.
The other participant saved the passenger!”). In the respective
trials in the compound effect group the message always read “Auf-
grundeinertechnischen Fehlfunktionistnure in Rettungsring ins
Wassergefallen!” (German for “Due to a technical fault only one
life buoy fell into the water”). In both groups the message had to
be acknowledged with a click on a check box labeled “Ok!”
The two instruction blocks comprised 20 trials each, resulting
in an instruction phase comprising of 20 self-performed and 20
observed instruction trials. After the instruction phase, partici-
pants performed 26 practice trials that included all trial types that
would be in the main experimental blocks to ensure that partici-
pants understood all tasks. Six experimental blocks with 48 trials
each followed. In each block, each delay (−50, −40, −30, −20,
−10, 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 ms) was repeated four times. In
addition, there were four reminder trials per block in which only
one buoy appeared (red or yellow presented at the left or right
side). The temporal and spatial order of the effects’ appearance was
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counterbalanced within participants. Each effect appeared equally
as often on the left side as on the right side of the screen.
Before debriefing at the end of the experiments we asked par-
ticipants separately to describe their task and why the computers’
were connected. All but one (the excluded participant) described
the experiment as instructed and did not suspect the instructions
to be false.
DATA ANALYSIS
In each experimental trial participants indicated whether the yel-
low or the red effect appeared first. To analyze whether the “own”
effect is perceived earlier than the “other’s” effect and to com-
pare TOJs with the compound effect group, we made the arbitrary
decision to analyze how often the yellow buoy was perceived ear-
lier than the red buoy1, i.e., for each participant and delay we
calculated the proportion of “yellow first” responses. Based on this
analysis, we expected that participants who believed they caused
the yellow effect to perceive the yellow effect earlier than par-
ticipants who believed they caused the red effect. Furthermore,
participants in the compound effect group were expected to per-
ceive the yellow effect later than participants who believed they
caused the yellow effect, but earlier than participants who believed
they caused the red effect. About 3.9% of all planned TOJ trials
were stopped before any effect appeared because the participants
did not respond within 750 ms.
We fitted logistic functions to the “yellow first” responses using
the psignifit toolbox (Wichmann and Hill, 2001) for MATLAB.
From each fitted function we calculated the 50%-value of the
function, the Point of Subjective Simultaneity (PSS). This value
represents the temporal delay between the yellow and the red
effect that results in the participant not being able to discrimi-
nate the order of the two stimuli and thus has to guess, resulting
in 50% “red first” and 50% “yellow first” responses. When the yel-
low buoy is perceived earlier than the red buoy, the PSS is larger
than zero, indicating that a yellow buoy that occurs x ms after a
red buoy is perceived as occurring simultaneously with the red
buoy. In contrast, when the red buoy is perceived earlier than the
yellow buoy, the PSS is smaller than zero because the yellow buoy
that appears×ms before the red buoy is perceived as occurring
simultaneously with the red buoy.
We also calculated the difference limen (DL) as the difference
between the 75% and the 25% score of the function divided by
two. The DL is a measure for the steepness of the function and
indicates the temporal resolution of the judgments of each partic-
ipant. The higher the temporal resolution of judgments, the more
consistent a participant is in his/her judgments regarding each
delay, resulting in a steeper function and thus a smaller DL.
RESULTS
We conducted ANOVAs on the PSS and the DLs including the
between-subjects factor type of causal belief (single yellow effect,
single red effect, compound effect).
1As in the compound effect group, because no effect is assigned as “own” effect we
cannot analyze according to the “own” and the “other’s” effect. Choosing the “yel-
low first” responses was arbitrary, but because each response was a discrete decision
between “yellow first” and “red first,” the results would have been equal with the
opposite sign if we had chosen “red first” responses.
The ANOVA on the PSS revealed differences between causal
belief conditions, F(2,45)= 6.86, p= 0.003, η2p = 0.234 (see
Figure 3). When participants believed they caused the yellow effect
(single yellow effect), the yellow effect would have to appear 7.4 ms
after the red effect for them to be perceived simultaneously (i.e.,
the PSS was 7.4 ms). When participants believed they caused the
red effect (single red effect), the red effect would have to appear
5.4 ms after the yellow effect for them to be perceived simultane-
ously (i.e., the PSS was−5.5 ms). When participants believed they
caused both effects (compound effect), the yellow effect would
have to appear 1.2 ms after the red effect for them to be perceived
simultaneously.
Post hoc t -tests revealed that each single comparison was signif-
icant, i.e., PSS for the single yellow effect group was larger than the
PSS in the compound effect group (7.4 vs. 1.2 ms), t (34)=−2.06,
p= 0.047, and it was larger than the PSS in the single red effect
group (7.4 vs. −5.5 ms), t (22)=−3.04, p= 0.006. In the single
red effect group the PSS was smaller than in the compound group,
t (34)= 2.64, p= 0.012.
The ANOVA on the DLs revealed no difference between groups,
F(2,45)= 0.48, p= 0.622, η2p = 0.021. DLs amounted to 25.9 ms
in the single yellow effect group, to 23.8 ms in single red effect
group, and to 22.0 ms in the compound effect group.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we aimed at investigating whether different causal
beliefs about who causes one of two effect stimuli influence the
perceived temporal order of these effect stimuli. Participants who
believed they caused only one of two effect stimuli perceived their
“own” effect earlier than the “other’s” effect. This confirms the
assumption of stronger IB for allegedly “own” effects than for
effects that are believed to be caused by another person. The “own”
effect was also perceived earlier than the effect of the respective
color in a group of participants who believed they caused both
effects as compound effect. Thus, we can rule out that one of the
effects was generally perceived earlier than the other due to any
stimulus features.
To measure time perception for “own” effects, we applied TOJs.
TOJs have recently been shown to be a useful method to measure
the IB effect using a psychophysical method (Cravo et al., 2011).
Choosing this psychophysical method has at least two advantages.
First, in contrast to the clock paradigm, TOJs allow us to directly
compare the temporal order of a putative effect and another stim-
ulus within one trial. This let us directly assess the time perception
of the “own” and the “other’s” effect instead of deducing temporal
order from time estimations in different trials in relation to the
revolving clock hand.
Second, TOJs enable us to analyze not only the perceived time
(the PSS) of the effect stimuli, but also to compare the DLs of
time judgments as a measure of the temporal resolution of time
judgments (Nolden et al., 2012). Importantly, DLs did not differ
between the single effect group and the compound effect group.
Applying this method enabled us to rule out the possibility that
the manipulation of the causal belief influenced temporal reso-
lution because, for example, of changing difficulty level of the
task. Instead, the belief manipulation added a constant difference
to temporal estimations, but left the overall consistency in TOJs
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FIGURE 3 | Results of prototypical participants (left) and group means
for the PSS (right). On the left fitted functions of three prototypical
participants from the single effect yellow and red group (colors according to
group name) and the compound effect group (dashed line). The group means
of the points of subjective simultaneity are shown in the bar chart on the
right. Error bars depict standard errors.
unchanged. Thus, TOJs were biased by the causal belief, but this
bias did not affect the reliability of the TOJ.
Taken together, our result that “own” effects are perceived ear-
lier strengthens and extends the recent finding of Desantis et al.
(2011), who showed that an effect tone is perceived earlier in trials
in which the participant believed he/she caused the tone compared
to other trials when the participant believed that another person
caused the tone. Here the information who would cause the effect
tone in the next trial participants could have changed the level of
participants’ arousal or motivation in trials in which they knew
they would cause a tone with their key press compared to trials in
which they knew they would press a key, but hear another person’s
effect. In our study, participants compared the perceived time of
the “own” and the “other’s” effect relative to each other within
each trial. So the participants’ belief that they produced one spe-
cific effect remained constant throughout the experiment. This
enables us to exclude any possible explanation based on trial-by-
trial differences for differing time judgments between “own” and
“other’s” effects. Instead causal belief influences the perceived time
of action effects on a stimulus-specific level. In addition, assessing
the DLs of time judgments enables us to rule out that the tempo-
ral resolution differs depending on the instruction to cause one or
two effects. To sum up, our study fosters the conclusion that IB is
stronger for allegedly “own” action effects than for action effects
that are attributed to another person’s action.
The influence of causality and causal beliefs on IB has been dis-
cussed from the time the IB effect was first described (see Moore
and Obhi, 2012 for a recent review). Eagleman and Holcombe
(2002), for example, discussed whether the temporal attraction
between action and effect was the counterpart of larger perceived
causality between cause and effects the closer the effect appears
after the cause (Hume, 1739; Michotte, 1963). Similarly, IB has
been discussed as a process that supports the feeling of agency,
i.e., the perceived causal control over one’s action effects. Interest-
ingly, agency and IB have been found to be correlated only when
both measures are collected within one trial, but not when they are
measured in different trials (Ebert and Wegner, 2010; see also Obhi
and Hall, 2011). Nevertheless, there is evidence that IB depends on
causal beliefs because IB effects occur for action effects, but not
for effects caused by observed non-agentic sources (Wohlschläger
et al., 2003a,b; Cravo et al., 2009). Furthermore, IB in terms of a
later perception of the action is restricted to cases where the causal
relation between action and effect is highly reliable in terms where
the effect follows the action with high contingency (Moore and
Haggard, 2008; Moore et al., 2009).
Recently, the impact of causality on IB has been demonstrated
even more convincingly. Dogge et al. (2012) observed IB even in
the absence of a voluntary action. In that study, the effect of an
involuntary passive key press was perceived shifted toward the key
press when participants believed that the passive key press caused
the effect. In contrast, when no causal belief instruction was given
about a causal relation between key press and effect tone, there was
no shift in the perceived time of the effect. The authors assume
that the predictive thought of the effect (cf. Wegner and Wheatley,
1999) before the passively induced key press leads to an increased
level of perceived control and thus to a shift in the perceived time
of the effect when the movement was believed to cause the effect,
even in the absence of a voluntary movement. This shift in the
perceived time of the effect is smaller after involuntary compared
to voluntary key presses, but it shows that even in the absence of
an intended movement the causal relation between the movement
and the effect is sufficient to induce a certain degree of IB.
Further support of a relation between causal belief and IB is
evidenced in a study of Buehner and Humphreys (2009). Their
participants heard two tones and were asked synchronize two key
presses to the two tones. In a non-causal condition the second
tone followed the first after a fixed interval. In a “causal condi-
tion” the second tone was caused by the first key press and thus
occurred after a fixed interval after the action (the same interval
as in the non-causal condition). Actually, participants timed the
two key presses in relation to the times of the tones differently in
the two conditions, suggesting that they perceived the action and
effect to be closer in time in the causal condition as suggested by IB
(see Buehner and Humphreys, 2010 for similar results on causal
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relations between spatial stimuli). However, in this experiment
causality was manipulated in that there were physical differences
such as different time intervals in the causal and non-causal con-
ditions. In our study there were no physical differences between
“own” effects and “other’s” effects across participants confirming
that it is actually the causal belief alone that changed the perceived
time of action effects.
Interestingly, the conclusion that “own” effects are perceived
earlier than others’ effects seems to be contradicted by recent
results reported by Obhi and Hall, 2011; for similar results see
also Strother et al., 2010). They investigated IB in a social situa-
tion, in which two participants performed a task together on one
computer with one shared key. In each trial, one participant trig-
gered a tone by pressing the key and the other participant was
to respond by pressing the same key as quickly as possible after
the key was pressed. Two-hundred milliseconds after the first key
press a tone effect occurred. Each participant then judged who
they believed had caused the effect (the actor) and the time of
the actor’s key press. In this study, the IB effect was not reduced
when the participant was the responder and thus judged the time
of the actor’s, i.e., another person’s, key press and effect than when
the participant was the actor himself/herself. That is, time judg-
ments for the action and the effect were the same, regardless of
whether the participant believed that the other participant caused
the effect (and thus judged the observed action of the actor) or
whether the participant believed himself/herself to be the actor
(and thus judged the time of his/her own action).
To resolve this contradiction we suggest that there is a criti-
cal difference between the experimental setting of Desantis et al.
(2011) and our setting on the one hand, and between the experi-
mental setting of Obhi and Hall (2011) on the other hand. In Obhi
and Hall’s study participants were instructed to cooperate on the
experimental task. In contrast, in the study of Desantis et al. par-
ticipants performed the task on their own, and in our study no
cooperation was needed because one life buoy would be sufficient
to save a swimmer’s life. This fits well with Obhi and Hall’s, 2011,
p. 655) suggestion that participants might form “a ‘we’ identity” in
the shared task. Even if not directly expressed in the instructions,
our task implied a competitive rather than a cooperative situation
as only one participant, probably the faster, will complete the task.
The instruction to cooperate on a single task might be the
reason that participants showed a similar amount of IB for
own and observed actions and effects in Obhi and Hall’s (2011)
study. Another line of research, the so-called “social Simon-effect,”
demonstrates that in cooperative settings, participants integrate
the intention of another person into their own task set (Sebanz
et al., 2003; Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006; Dolk et al., 2011; Liepelt
et al., 2011). For example, when two participants share a Simon
task, that is, one participant responds to green targets by press-
ing a left key and another participants responds to red targets by
pressing a right key, performance is influenced by the location of
the target. A participant who responds with the left key responds
more slowly when the target stimuli occurs on the right (incom-
patible) side of the screen than when the target occurs on the
left (compatible) side of the screen. In contrast, when one par-
ticipant performs his/her half of the task alone (which is actually
a Go-NoGo task, e.g., respond to green targets, do not respond
to red targets), the compatibility effect regarding the location of
the target and the response key is heavily reduced. Based on this
evidence, we assume that participants adopt the intention of the
other participant more strongly when participants cooperate on a
task than when they infer from information given on screen that
the effect they perceive will be caused by another person perform-
ing the same task at the same time (as in the study of Desantis
et al., 2011) or when they compete on a task (as in our study). This
assumption could explain why on the one hand Obhi and Hall
(2011) found in a collaborative situation the size of IB in terms of
the perceptual shift of actions and effects toward each other was
independent of whether actions and effects are attributed to the
own action or the action of an observed participant. On the other
hand the assumption would also explain why in non-collaborative
situations both Desantis et al. (2011) and we observed stronger
IB in terms of an earlier perception of the “own” compared to
“another person’s” effect. However, this is a post hoc hypothesis
and future studies are needed to investigate how cooperation vs.
competition changes the perceived time of another person’s action
effects.
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